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INTRODUCTION
More than twenty years ago, Morton Birnbaum proposed a
right to treatment on behalf of the institutionalized mentally
ill.1 His argument was simple and elegant: The state, in exercis-
ing its power to commit, deprives mental inmates of a variety of
procedural and substantive rights.2 The quid pro quo that justi-
fies this deprivation is treatment. Thus, mental commitment
without treatment violates inmates' constitutional rights.' In
Rouse v. Cameron,4 Judge David Bazelon elaborated on the
right to treatment, and a number of states' and federal .circuits
*' See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960).
2 Id. at 502-03.
3 Id. Unjustified incarceration obviously violates a patient's right to liberty,
id. at 503, but a failure to provide treatment can also subvert custodial protec-
tion, the principal competing goal of confinement for mental illness. See
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring);
notes 150-202 and accompanying text infra. Without an adequate staff of psy-
chologists, psychiatrists, and other mental health workers, and without the
spur of regularly scheduled treatments and meetings with the patient, the
quality of care afforded at public institutions may decline to shocking levels.
Consider the conditions in Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2313 (1981) (No. 80-1429, 1981 Term); New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); and Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
rev'd in part, remanded in part sub. nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974). In Romeo, the petitioner suffered over 70 bodily injuries, some
of which became infected either from inadequate medical attention or from
contact with human excrement that the institution's staff failed to remove. 644
F.2d at 155. In Rockefeller, the court found over 1,300 reported incidents of
injury, assaults on patients, or fights during one eight-month period. The court
noted that there were only half the number of doctors needed, and all other
staff were in similarly short supply. Generally, the conditions were "hazardous
to the health, safety, and sanity of the residents." 357 F. Supp. at 755-57. See
notes 153-158 and accompanying text infra. In Wyatt, the Court found over-
crowding, fire and other emergency hazards, poorly trained staff, inadequate
numbers of staff, and failure to provide a humane psychological and physical
environment. 325 F. Supp. at 782-84.
4 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (right to treatment for a criminal defendant
acquitted of an offense by reason of insanity and subsequently committed to a
mental hospital).
1 States that recognize a right to treatment by statute or case law include:
Alabama, ALA. CODE tit.' 22, §§ 189-230 (1975); Alaska, ALAsKA STAT. §
19821
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subsequently adopted some form of the right.
The right to treatment for the confined mentally ill has come
before the United States Supreme Court on two occasions. In
O'Connor v. Donaldson,7 the Court considered a damages suit
brought by a mental inmate who charged that the institution in
which he had been confined improperly denied him release or
treatment.' Finding that the inmate could live outside the insti-
tution with the help of friends, the Court ordered his release.9
47.30.130 (1971); Arizona, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-224 (right to treatment
for criminals); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1409 (1979); California, CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5152, 5172, 5250(c), 5260(c), 5307 (West Cum. Supp.
1981); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. § 27-10-101 (1975); Connecticut, CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 17-206(c) (1973); Delaware, DEL. CODE tit. 16, §§ 5121-5135 (1970 and
Cum. Supp. 1980); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE § 21-562 (1973); Georgia,
GEORGIA CODE § 88-502.2 (1978); Illinois, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 1/2 (1973), Indi-
ana, IND. CODE § 16-14-1-2 (1971); Kansas, KAN. STAT. § 59-2927 (1973); Ken-
tucky, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202.267 (Baldwin 1972); Louisiana, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 28:182 (West 1969); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. tit. 34, § 2252 (1965);
Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 2 (1972); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 123, § 2 (West 1972); Michigan, Silvers v. People, 22 Mich. App. 1,
176 N.W.2d 702 (1970); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-17-5 (1972); Mis-
souri, Mo. REV. STAT. § 630.115 (1980); Montana, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
38-1309 (1975); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 83-307, -356 (1971); New Hamp-
shire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-B:42-44 (1973); New Jersey, Application of
D.D., 118 N.J. Super. 1, 6, 285 A.2d 283, 286 (1971); New York, N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 7.05 (McKinney 1973); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-
55.1, 122-55.5-.6 (1974); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 91 (1971); Pennsyl-
vania, 50 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4201 (1969); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-
306(b) (1973); Texas, Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-70 (Vernon 1958);
Utah, UTAH CODE § 64-7-6 (1968); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7703
(1977); Washington, WASH. REv. CoDe § 71.05.360(2) (1974); West Virginia, W.
VA. CODE §§ 27-5-9 (1974).
6 Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977) (right to treatment for a
prison inmate); Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977) (leaving open
right to treatment for state mental hospital patients); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d
939 (3d Cir. 1976) (right to treatment for state mental hospital patient); Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (right to treatment for state mental
hospital inmates). Federal district courts in other circuits have also recognized
the right to treatment. See, e.g., Flakes v. Percy, 511 F. Supp. 1325 (W.D. Wis.
1981) (inmates have a right to minimum level of treatment adequate to cure);
Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (right to treatment
for those involuntarily confined); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D.
Ohio 1974) (articulating standards for mental patient's right to treatment).
7 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
s Id. at 565-73.
1 Id. at 568, 577.
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Although the case was decided on right to liberty rather than on
right to treatment grounds, Justice Burger wrote an impassioned
concurrence'0 in which he argued that a right to treatment does
not and should not exist."'
Late in the 1981 term, the Supreme Court decided a second
case presenting right to treatment issues, again declining to con-
front the right squarely. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman" presented the question of whether a federal stat-
ute"' created a substantive right and cause of action for an insti-
tution's failure to provide appropriate treatment. The Supreme
Court held that the statute expressed only a congressional
"nudge"14 and remanded the case to determine whether state
law supplied a concrete right.15
Youngberg v. Romeo,"' a case currently before the Court on
writ of certiorari, also presents right to treatment issues. In Ro-
meo, the Third Circuit found that the involuntarily committed
mentally retarded have a right to treatment based on the four-
teenth amendment. 7 This right implicates "mixed questions of
law and medical judgment,"'18 requiring flexible judicial review
and a degree of deference to medical expertise.' ° The right arises
regardless of the basis of commitment--danger to self, danger to
others, or need for treatment.
3 0
Romeo presents a number of issues other than the right to
treatment, including a right against shackling and a right to pro-
10 For a fascinating account of the maneuverings surrounding the Chief Jus-
tice's concurring opinion and the majority decision, see B. WOODWARD & S.
ARMSTRONG, THn BRETHREN 437-54 (1979).
11 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 578 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
12 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981).
Is 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1978) (the Developmental Disabilities Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act).
" Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1541
(1981). But see id. at 1547-48 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
15 Id. at 1546-47.
1 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2313 (1981) (No. 80-
1429, 1981 Term).
17 Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 158-59, 165-66, 168-69 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2313 (1981) (No. 80-1429, 1981 Term).
18 Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 159 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101
S. Ct. 2313 (1981) (No. 80-1429, 1981 Term).
" Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 158-59, 165 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 2313 (1981) (No. 80-1429, 1981 Term).
"o Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 165 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101
S. Ct. 2313 (1981) (No. 80-1429, 1981 Term).
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tection from harm.2 1 It is therefore possible that, as it did in
O'Connor and Pennhurst, the Court will decide Romeo on non-
treatment grounds. Still, the frequency with which right to
treatment cases have arisen, the intense public interest they
generate,2 3 and the lack of unanimity among the circuits2' sug-
gest that the Supreme Court will soon confront the "right" and
decide whether it actually exists.
When the Court does confront the right, Chief Justice Bur-
ger's concurring opinion in O'Connor v. Donaldson will likely as-
sume major significance. It is the only existing opinion by a Su-
preme Court Justice on the question.2 5  Moreover, it is
unequivocal: Chief Justice Burger opposes such a right and will
vote against it when the issue comes before the Court. Unless
the Chief Justice has changed his position-and there is no indi-
cation that he has-the objections he raised in O'Connor remain
of continuing importance.
This article identifies and evaluates Chief Justice Burger's ob-
jections to a right to treatment. Some of the Chief Justice's ob-
jections are aimed only at a constitutionally based right; others
focus on any type of right to treatment.26 His first objection is
that a right to treatment is inconsistent with society's tradi-
11 Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 159-62 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted,
101 S. Ct. 2313 (1981) (No. 80-1429, 1981 Term).
* See cases cited in notes 5-6 supra.
23 In Romeo, for example, at least 23 amicus curiae briefs were filed, includ-
ing briefs submitted by every major psychological and psychiatric association
and many state attorneys general. Telephone interview with Edmond Tiryak,
attorney for respondent Nicholas Romeo, in Philadelphia (December 8, 1981).
But see Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institu-
tional Litigation, 93 HAtv. L. REv. 465 (1980) (arguing that the "extraordi-
nary" concern and attention that center around such "institutional" cases are
unwarranted).
24 Courts that have adopted a right to treatment are cited in note 6 supra.
Cases that have refused to recognize the right include: Morales v. Turman, 562
F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977); Marshall v. Parker, 470 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1972) (drug
addict has no constitutional right to rehabilitation program), aff'd sub nom.
Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1973).
" The majority opinion in O'Connor rested on "right to liberty" grounds,
and did not reach the issue of a mental patient's right to treatment. O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 n.12 (1975).
2' For example, the Chief Justice's "historical" and "medical" criticisms ar-
gue equally against statutory and constitutionally based right to treatment. His
doctrinal objections seem mainly aimed at a constitutional quid pro quo argu-
ment. See notes 108-148 and accompanying text infra.
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tional views of mental illness.2 7 Another group of objections are
"medical," based on the notion that mental illness cannot or
should not be approached with treatment as an objective.2 " After
addressing these, the article evaluates several objections based
on doctrinal or institutional considerations, and the possibility
of abuse of the right to treatment. 9 The final section discusses
four recently developed theories supporting a right to treatment
and evaluates the extent to which each survives the Chief Jus-
tice's criticisms.30 The article does not decide whether a right to
treatment is constitutionally compelled or even wise. Rather, it
concludes only that a right to treatment is maintainable in the
face of Chief Justice Burger's objections.
I. ANALYSIS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S ARGUMENTS
A. The Historical Argument
To support his conclusion that no constitutional right to treat-
ment now exists, the Chief Justice asserts that custodial care,
not treatment, has historically been the major goal of state
mental institutions." The suggestion that treatment has been
only a secondary goal of confinement for mental illness does not,
however, withstand critical scrutiny.32
" See notes 31-76 and accompanying text infra.
"s See notes 77-107 and accompanying text infra.
11 See notes 108-148 and accompanying text infra.
SO See notes 149-284 and accompanying text infra.
31 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring). But see Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (the
purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment, not mere custodial care or
punishment), rev'd in part, remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
'2 The following analysis addresses only the accuracy of the Chief Justice's
historical argument. It does not address the broader question of the wisdom of
judicial reliance on historical or social science research. Such research has been
used and abused by advocates and jurists alike. For a discussion of the role of
social science literature in the early segregation cases, see Craven, The Impact
of Social Science Evidence on the Judge: A Personal Comment, 39 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 150 (Winter 1975). See also Yudof, School Desegregation:
Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Su-
preme Court, 42 LAW & CONtEMP. PROBS. 57 (Autumn 1978). Particularly in
the jury trial cases, the Court has contorted and misused social science re-
search. In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), the Court used empirical
research to conclude that five-member criminal juries failed to provide the
minimum constitutional protection demanded by the sixth amendment. Ear-
1982] 533
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1. Treatment in Ancient Times and the Middle Ages
In ancient Roman, Greek, Israeli, and Byzantine societies,
treatment and rehabilitation of the mentally ill were recognized
concerns."3 Ancient therapies included songs, shrines, milieu
therapy, bleedings, special diets, physical restraint, calm, and
drugs. 4 Methods suggested in a 15th century textbook included
hospitalization, music therapy, environmental stimulus, and
soothing activities.35 Arab healers developed an impressive mi-
lieu therapy that emphasized open buildings with courtyards
where patients participated in and watched plays, heard stories
lier, in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Court had held six-member
juries to be constitutionally adequate in criminal trials. See id. at 100-02. Wil-
liams generated much scholarly work on jury size, which, the Bahlew Court
noted, dramatically demonstrated that six-member juries failed to provide the
constitutional protection of twelve-member panels. 435 U.S. at 231-39. The
Ballew Court further reasoned that, if six-member panels were constitutionally
inferior to twelve-member panels, then five-member panels must be worse. But
despite acknowledging data that clearly showed six-member panels to be inad-
equate, the Ballew judgment reaffirmed the constitutionality of six-member ju-
ries in criminal cases. Id. at 243-45. Chief Justice Burger, in concurrence with
Justice Powell, questioned the efficacy of using social science data to support
the desired results. Id. at 246 (Powell, J., Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., con-
curring). The Chief Justice has further observed that "[tihe commands of the
Constitution cannot fluctuate with the shifting tides of scientific opinion." Ei-
senstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 470 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
One may question whether a conclusion that history does not support a right
to treatment implies anything significant about recognizing such a right today.
Legal doctrine is ever-changing. The Court's great strides in past decades in
support of individual rights refute any static concept of American jurispru-
dence. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Washing-
ton v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948).
33 J. NEAMAN, SUGGESTION OF THE DEVIL, INSANITY IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 5, 24-26 (1978); G. ROSEN, MADNESS IN SOCIETY, 21-
136 (1968).
" J. NEAMAN, supra note 33, at 24-26.
35 T. GRAHAM, MEDIEVAL MINDS 64-65 (1967). Caelius Aurelianus, for exam-
ple, urged treatment with warm sponges, woolen pads, plays, and general com-
fort. Alexander of Tralles suggested violent "cures" by bleeding and decep-
tions, and Paul of Aegina urged hydrotherapy and recreation. Id. at 31-34.
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and discussions, and read books. 6 These approaches anticipated
modern projective doll-play and psychodrama therapy. 7 Roman
therapists even used primitive electroshock treatment.38 Thus,
in ancient times treatment was indeed a "major goal" in dealing
with mental illness.
2. Treatment in American Colonial Society
Although some early New England towns enacted ordinances
recognizing the community's responsibility as guardian of the
mentally ill,89 others did not. Unprotected, mentally ill persons
were often sold as slaves. 0 Institutional care began in America
in 1773 with the opening of the Eastern Lunatic Asylum in Wil-
liamsburg, Virginia.41 Similar hospitals were soon operating in
Italy, England,42 and most of the American colonies. Prevailing
theories of that time attributed mental illness to the pressures of
modern society." Mental illness was therefore considered sus-
ceptible to cure:4 5 Patients needed only isolation from the
world's fast pace and humane, nonphysical treatment combined
with activity therapy.4 6 Fantastic cure rates of 90 to 100% were
36 Id. at 56-58.
11 Id. at 58; J. NEAMAN, supra note 33, at 11.
J. NEAMAN, supra note 33, at 12.
39 L. BELL, TREATING THE MENTALLY ILL FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRE-
SENT 3 (1980).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 5; G. ROSEN, supra note 33, at 275-76.
42 G. ROSEN, supra note 33, at 275-76.
41 Id. at 276.
44 L. BELL, supra note 39, at 25 et seq.
45 Id. at 15; R. CAPLAN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE COMMUNITY IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA, THE RECURRING CONCERN WITH THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE
PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS 9 (1969); G. ROSEN, supra
note 33, at 276.
46 L. BELL, supra note 39, at 25; M. GREENBLATT, R. YORK & E. BROWN,
FROM CUSTODIAL TO THERAPEUTIC PATIENT CARE IN MENTAL HosPrrALs 407
(1955). The theory was explained in J. CONOLLY, TREATMENT OF THE INSANE
WITHOUT MECHANICAL RESTRAINTS (reprint ed. 1973):
We seek a mild air for the consumptive, and place the asthmatic in
an atmosphere which does not irritate him, and keep a patient with
'heart disease on level ground; and on the same prophylatic and
curative principles, we must study to remove from an insane per-
son every influence that can further excite his brain, and to sur-
round him with such as, acting soothingly on both body and mind,
may favour the brain's rest, and promote the recovery of its normal
1982] 535
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reported, "7 and by mid-century, asylums were considered the
proper and progressive solution to mental illness.4 The "major
goal" at that time, given the grand projection of curability, was
clearly treatment rather than custodial care.4"
3. The Emergence of Custodial Care
In the late 19th century, asylums began to de-emphasize treat-
ment in favor of custodial care. This shift resulted not so much
from changes in social thinking regarding the efficacy of treat-
ment as from changes in political views, economic events, and
professional perceptions.
a. Political Factors
At least three political factors worked to undermine the con-
cept of treatment. First, after the Civil War, states became ac-
tively concerned with operating and regulating mental hospi-
tals?' Superintendent positions were often given to the
action.
Id. at 55.
17 L. BELL, supra note 39, at 15, 26; R. CAPLAN, supra note 45, at 90; R.
HUNTER & I. MACALPINE, THREE HUNDRED YEARS OF PSYCHIATRY, 1535-1860, at
988 (1963) ("cure rates" of up to 68%). See M. GREENBLATT, R. YORK & E.
BROWN, supra note 46, at 411 ("cure" rates of over 50%).
48 See D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM 130-54 (1971); D. Dix,
ON BEHALF OF THE INSANE POOR (reprint ed. 1971).
9 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582 (1975) (Burger, C.J., con-
curring) (custodial care historically the prime goal of confinement for mental
illness). To support his assertion, the Chief Justice cites A. DEUTSCH, THE
MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 98-113 (2d ed. 1949). 422 U.S. at 582. But our read-
ing of Deutsch's work does not yield this interpretation. The cited pages in Mr.
Deutsch's work support, in our view, the opposite proposition. See notes 50-53,
59-62 and accompanying text infra (custodial care only a fall-back position
when therapeutic treatment became politically or financially unfeasible; custo-
dial care never a primary goal).
50 L. BELL, supra note 39, at 36; A. DEUTSCH, supra note 49, at 249-52. Some
advisory boards sought to discontinue the prevailing practice of treating both
the "chronic" and "temporarily" insane. Id. at 257-59. This led, of course, to
custodial care for those patients found to be "chronically insane." Id. at 263.
These state-sponsored movements from treatment to custodial care were initi-
ated, not because of a change in the belief regarding the efficacy of treatment,
but because of institutional responses to overcrowding. Id. at 263. Even under
the dual treatment plan, all patients were given the opportunity to respond to
treatment; only those who showed no benefit were sent to custodial institu-
tions. Id. at 266.
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inexperienced as political favors.5 Second, increasing numbers
of civil and criminal commitments led to overcrowded facilities,
destroying the peaceful therapeutic milieu.52 Finally, public sup-
port for mental hospitals waned when it became clear that au-
thorities were committing immigrants to institutions at the ex-
pense of the fee-paying middle class.
53
b. Economic Factors
Economic conditions also contributed to the decline of mental
treatment. The typical treatment hospital was a rather lavish
building with expansive grounds." By the 1850s, inflation, bank
failures, and massive public work programs required drastic re-
ductions in appropriations for asylums." By the next decade,
many asylums stood in disrepair.6 The public, already suspi-
cious of increased costs and unwilling to support immigrants, be-
gan to turn against state-supported mental institutions. Inade-
', L. BELL, supra note 39, at 54; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 48, at 270.
52 L. BELL, supra note 39, at 29-30; R. CAPLAN, supra note 45, at 58-69.
53 R. CAPLAN, supra note 45, at 72, 80. Because hospital administrators were
unable to deal with immigrants' seemingly violent and uncivilized rejection of
Protestant norms, they reverted to force and regimentation to control patients.
Id. at 48. Moral treatment, which had been created to serve the Protestant
work ethic, was seen as inappropriate for treating persons who did not fit those
cultural patterns. Id. at 73. See also L. BELL, supra note 39, at 33, 58-73; N.
DAIN, CONCEPTS OF INSANITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1865, at 129 (1964);
M. GREENBLATT, R. YORK & E. BROWN, supra note 46, at 412-13; D. ROTHMAN,
supra note 48, at 273, 283-85.
D. ROTHMAN, supra note 48, at 130-54.
5 R. CAPLAN, supra note 45, at 81-82; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 48, at 270.
" R. CAPLAN, supra note 45, at 82.
51 Id. at 79. Caplan explains further that:
The financial difficulties of asylums strained relationships between
doctors and patients and between practitioners and community. In
the former case, superintendents were obliged to subordinate ther-
apeutics to administration, to spend a large amount of time on hos-
pital accounts, on plotting economies, and in lobbying for more
funds. The liberality of earlier, smaller, well-endowed institutions
was necessarily curtailed. In the community, meanwhile, [mental
health therapists] and laymen had contact more and more on
money matters rather than on other issues. The legislator was the
source of public monies, the private citizen of donations and be-
quests. This inevitably affected relations between the hospital and
the extramural world, in which professionals were suppliants for
their own salaries, as well as for hospital funds.
Id. at 86.
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quate funding eventually led to severe overcrowding that
paralyzed the therapeutic programs, transforming hospitals into
custodial facilities.5
c. Medical and Professional Factors
Perhaps the final blow to the therapeutic ideal of the 18th
century came when proponents of treatment realized that early
predictions of curability were grossly exaggerated.5 9 Cure rates
had fallen dramatically by the 1870s, with a corresponding drop
in public and professional confidence in treatment. 0 The public
could not be persuaded to contribute money for treating pa-
tients doomed forever to insanity.61 The profession reacted by
questioning the efficacy of its own treatment. By overselling it-
self, the movement had contributed to its own demise.6"
Moreover, by the late 19th century, most of the original pro-
ponents of treatment had been replaced with younger superin-
tendents, who did not share the founders' goals.63 These admin-
istrators were often political appointees who cared more about
efficiency than therapy." Efficiency was a goal more consistent
with custodial care than with therapy.
With the demise of curability came a new theory of insanity:
causation based on heredity. Social Darwinism justified and, in
fact, required custodial care in lieu of treatment for those mem-
" N. DAIN, supra note 53, at 129-30; M. GREENBLATT, R. YORK & E. BROWN,
supra note 46, at 412; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 48; at 270.
19 See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 48, at 266-68; note 47 supra.
60 R. CAPLAN, supra note 45, at 49. The earlier cure rates were based on
discharges; thus, patients admitted many times were counted as multiple cures.
Such accounting practices inflated and misrepresented the actual situation. Id.
at 91. See also N. DAIN, supra note 53, at 131-33; A. DEUTSCH, supra note 49,
at 232-51; G. ROSEN, supra note 33, at 278. See generally P. EARLE, THE CURA-
BILITY OF INSANITY (reprint ed. 1972).
61 L. BELL, supra note 39, at 43; R. CAPLAN, supra note 45, at 49, 88-96.
62 L. BELL, supra note 39, at 43.
1s R. CAPLAN, supra note 45, at 98-103.
Id. at 102-03, 174.
All these factors conspired to bring into the practice of psychiatry
a heterogeneous collection of individuals, many of whom lacked the
originality, charisma, enthusiasm and dedication of the founders of
the profession. It was these men who influenced the further devel-





bers of society thought to be genetically inferior."" The new the-
ory of genetic causation thus rationalized custodial treatment of
"helpless," chronic patients,66 while the mental institution
served the important custodial function of protecting society
from genetic undersirables. 7
This review of the antecedents of current societal views of
treatment casts doubt on the Chief Justice's assertion that "pro-
viding places for custodial confinement of the so-called 'depen-
dent insane' . . . emerged as the major goal of the States' pro-
grams .. ."68 Characterizing the move to custodial care as a
"goal" suggests a change in society's belief in the desirability of
treatment. The historical literature does not suggest such an ad-
vertent policy change. The change in emphasis from treatment
to custodial care resulted instead from political, economic, and
professional medical factors in the late 19th century. Treatment
was never rejected as a proper goal; it was de-emphasized be-
cause it had become unpopular and expensive.
4. Treatment in the Twentieth Century
Treatment began to regain respect at the turn of the century.
The ensuing decades saw the rise and fall of various therapeutic
approaches: clinical treatment, 9 mental health centers,70 occu-
pational therapy,71 shock therapy,72 psychopharmacotherapy '
8
and community alternatives. 74 As one observer noted, "institu-
tional psychiatry has supported a bewildering array of therapeu-
tics that have followed a roller coaster pattern of fashion-
65 Some voiced the fear that if "weaker" individuals were "saved," they
would intermarry and spread their inferior genes. This was, of course, a handy
justification for custodial care of blacks and the Irish. Id. at 147.
66 Id. at 149.
61 L. BELL, supra note 39, at 36-37, 39, 58-73; N. DAIN, supra note 53, at 134;
M. GREENBLATT, R. YORK & E. BROWN, supra note 46, at 414; D. ROTHMAN,
supra note 48, at 274-75.
61 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582 (1975) (Burger, C.J., con-
curring).
69 L. BELL, supra note 39, at x-xi.
70 Id. at 74-88:
71 Id. at 120-23.
71 Id. at 135-40.
7 Id. at 150-60.
11 Id. at 164-80.
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ability."75 While critics have noted the propensity of many
institutions to emphasize custodial care,76 it would be inappro-
priate to infer that custodial care has been the goal of institu-
tionalization. Custodial care evolved only as a response to the
apparent failure of therapy. To characterize it as a policy goal of
state institutions is therefore misleading. Custodial care has
never been a goal, although it has been a necessity in chronic
cases. The goals of mental health institutions have been and re-
main treatment and cure.
Of course, if treatment and cure are the goals of commitment,
medicine must be able to achieve them. Chief Justice Burger's
next criticism is that a right to treatment is medically infeasible.
B. The "Medical" Objections
In his concurrence, the Chief Justice made several objections
that are related to modern medicine's ability to treat the men-
tally ill. He posited that there are many forms of untreatable
mental illness, 77 many types where the cure rate is low, 78 that
71 Id. at 181. The author continues:
A new therapy is introduced with great excitement and enthusi-
asm. Sophisticated, detailed reports verify its effectiveness and
show remarkable cure and improvement ratios. This excitement
and interest soon fade. Follow-up studies and additional research
challenge the initial reports and reveal that the therapy has limited
applications, that it should be given only a modest place in psychi-
atry's armamentarium. Even the most dramatic therapeutics have
followed this cycle of hope and disillusionment.
Id.
"6 By 1950, many state hospitals remained custodial. Id. at 103, 150. By
1961, as many as 80% of public institutions were custodial. Id. at 169.
77 O'Connor v. Donaldson; 422 U.S. 563, 578 n.2 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring). Of course, if mental illness does not exist, there is no need for a right to
treatment. See Szasz, The Right to Health, 57 GEo. L.J. 734 (1969) (arguing
that mental illness might not actually exist). Psychiatrist Thomas Szasz theo-
rizes that mental disease indeed does not exist; rather, patients simply suffer
"problems in living." T. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS 262 (1974).
Szasz assumes that the study of medicine is firmly grounded on changes in
"the physiochemical integrity of the body," id. at 12, and concludes that, be-
cause mental illness has no corresponding physical manifestations, it does not
exist. In Szasz's view, any attempt at involuntary treatment' is thus a "crime
against humanity." Id. at 268.
Szasz's views are being rejected, as it becomes increasingly apparent that
physical changes cause many mental disorders. See, e.g., T. HARRISON, HARRi-
SON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE (9th ed. 1980):
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psychiatric diagnoses are uncertain, 9 and that a large propor-
tion of mentally ill persons do not wish to be treated.80
1. Guaranteed Successful Treatment
Chief Justice Burger's principal "medical" objection-that in-
voluntarily committed patients need not be treated because suc-
cessful treatment cannot be guaranteed-distorts what the pro-
In recent years attention has been focused largely on biological fac-
tors, particularly chemical derangement of certain structures in the
limbic portion of the brain. . . . In several cases . . . the
norepinephrine levels in these regions have been significantly in-
creased. This finding, if verified, would incriminate a disorder in
neurotransmitter dynamics as the chemical pathology ...
Id. at 151. In the mentally ill, these neurotransmitters receive or dampen an
abnormal number of these messages. Berger, Biochemistry and the Schizo-
phrenias, 169 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISORDERS 90 (1981). See also K. HAAS,
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 148-49 (1980). Drug therapy can control this abnormal-
ity and alleviate the disorder.
It might be objected that this physical connection does not reveal the pri-
mary cause of mental illness: that which makes the neurotransmitters develop
abnormalities in the first place. In most medical illnesses, the physician can
point to a virus or bacterium as the cause of the illness. But indefiniteness does
not invalidate the existence of a disorder, whether physical or mental. Cancer
is a disease whose primary origin is unknown; there are many others. See, e.g.,
T. HARRISoN, supra this note, at 1584. Most physicians agree that a change in
the cell's genetic structure is responsible for cancerous growth, yet no general
consensus exists as to the cause of the structural change. Id. Several physical
illnesses with psychological components fit this pattern. Id. at 1683. See, e.g.,
Cushing's disease, id. at 1730, Addison's disease, id., and Grave's disease, id. at
1704. See also 1 A. FREEMAN, H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK, COMPREHENSIVE TEXT-
BOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1056-61 (3d ed. 1980). With some illnesses, both the phys-
ical cause and the mechanism of causation are known with relative certainty.
See, e.g., Gattaz, Ewald & Beckmann, The HLA System and Schizophrenia,
228 ARcHIV. PSYCHIATRIC AND NERVENKRANKHEITEN 205 (1980) (genetic linkages
in schizophrenia); Wertkamp, Stancer, Persad, Flood & Guttormsen, Depres-
sive Disorders and HLA: A Gene on Chromosome 6 That Can Affect Behavior,
305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1301 (1981) (genes at a locus on chromosome 6 a major
contribution to susceptibility to depressive illness); Wyatt, Potkin & Murphy,
Platelet Monoamine Oxidase Activity in Schizophrenia: A Review of the
Data, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 377 (1979) (enzyme dysfunction is a likely source
of schizophrenia). The charge that mental illness is a myth should thus be laid
to rest.
78 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
71 Id. at 579 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
" Id. at 584 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
University of California, Davis
ponents of treatment demand. At issue is not a right to cure, but
a right to treatment. It may be impossible for treatment to cure
every mental illness. Many patients, however, can be treated so
that their symptoms subside, enabling them to be discharged
and with continued therapy lead functional lives."' Thus, the
question should not be whether treatment will enable a patient
to recover with no chance of relapse. Rather, the question should
be whether with maintenance therapy the person can lead a
healthy life. Many forms of therapy are effective in this limited
sense. 2 The permanent cure rate should thus have little bearing
on the decision whether to recognize a right to treatment.
The next question is whether a treatment must benefit all
patients to be justifiable. Surely a therapy that is safe, not pro-
hibitively expensive, and beneficial to some patients should be
made available. Recent studies have shown that modern drugs
effectively relieve the symptoms of schizophrenia, 83 manic de-
pression,8 and other illnesses.8 5 Chief Justice Burger ignored
these developments in concluding that many patients are un-
81 See, e.g., notes 77 supra, 83-85 infra.
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., Alexander, Van Kammen & Bunney, Antipsychotic Effects of
Lithium in Schizophrenia, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 283 (1979) (lithium may
serve as an alternative to neuroleptics in treating schizophrenics); Wyatt, Bio-
chemistry and Schizophrenia (Part IV) The Neuroleptics-Their Mechanism
of Action: A Review of the Biochemical Literature, 12 PSYCHOPHARMACOL.
BULL. 5 (July 1976) (neuroleptic drugs clearly have positive effects in the treat-
ment of schizophrenia). Schizophrenia appears to be more easily treatable than
in the past. "About 60 percent of [patients hospitalized for an attack of acute
schizophrenia] will be socially recovered five years later." 2 A. FREEMAN, H.
KAPLAN & B. SADOCK, supra note 77, at 1189.
84 See, e.g., Amsterdam, Brunswick & Mendels, The Clinical Application of
Tricyclic Antidepressant Pharmacokinetics and Plasma Levels, 137 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 653 (1980) (tricyclic antidepressants have become the preferred
treatment for most types of depressive illnesses, and have been found to be
about 70% effective); Davis, Overview: Maintenance Therapy in Psychiatry:
II. Affective Disorders, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1 (1976) (empirical data consist-
ently show that lithium has a substantial prophylactic effect). See also
Mendels, Lithium in the Treatment of Depression, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 373
(1976); Weissman, Prusoff, DiMascio, Neu, Goklaney, & Klerman, The Efficacy
of Drugs and Psychotherapy in the Treatment of Acute Depressive Episodes,
136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 555 (1979) (combination treatment was most effective).
85 Anxiety has been relieved by use of a benzodiazepine derivative. Mc-
Curdy, Lorazepam, A New Benzodiazepine Derivative in the Treatment of




treatable. Instead, the Chief Justice relied on Professor
Schwitzgebel's The Right to Effective Treatment,"' which indi-
cated that modern treatment methods are substantially ineffec-
tive. Schwitzgebel's observation, however, concerned conven-
tional "talking" therapy, 7 no longer the preferred treatment for
many illnesses."8 The Chief Justice's statement that treatment is
not effective is thus untenable in light of current research.
i
2. Uncertain Psychiatric Diagnoses
Another of the Chief Justice's objections to a right to treat-
ment concerned "uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis ...
[and] a, divergence of medical opinion .. ."' There is some
truth to the statement that psychiatrists do not always concur.' 0
The situation is not as haphazard and inaccurate as Chief Jus-
tice Burger believes, however. A brief history of psychiatry dem-
onstrates the scope of the problem.
Before the invention of the microscope, medical doctors could
not delve into cells and microorganisms to find a biological basis
for illness. They were forced to base their diagnoses on personal
observation. 1 When psychiatry developed, it used the same pro-
cess of diagnosis.'9 In the mid-19th century, however, medical
scientists discovered the underlying biological causes of symp-
toms and were no longer limited to less accurate observation
methods.' Modern psychiatry has not yet made a comparable
leap, but it appears to be on the verge of doing so."'
Psychiatrists have worked to hone their diagnostic categories,
to make their science as objective as possible. Their first step
was to promulgate the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
86 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring) (citing Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective Mental Treatment, 62 CALIF.
L. REV. 936 (1974).
" Schwitzgebel, supra note 86, at 941-48.
8 See notes 77, 83-85 supra.
89 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 579 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
90 1 A. FREEMAN, H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK, supra note 77, at 1041-42.
01 See, e.g., C. SINGER & E. UNDERWOOD, A SHORT HISTORY OF MEDICINE (2d
ed. 1962).
92 See, e.g., F. ALEXANDER & S. SELESNICK, THE HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY
(1966).
9S See, e.g., A CASTIGLIONI, A HISTORY OF MEDICINE 667-742 (1941).
" See generally notes 77-83 supra, 98-100 and accompanying text infra.
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Mental Disorders (DSM I),95 a nationwide system for classifying
mental disorders. A revised system, DSM II, was published in
1967.16 Studies showed that the accuracy of these initial systems
proved high in some areas, but only fair or low in others.Y Thus,
in 1975, Chief Justice Burger's statement that psychiatric diag-
nosis was uncertain contained an element of truth.
Five years after Chief Justice Burger wrote his concurrence in
O'Connor, however, DSM III was published.98 Its improved for-
mat included narrower definitions, provided diagnostic criteria,
and used a multi-axial framework. A reliability study by its au-
thors concluded that in "most of the diagnostic classes the relia-
bility was quite good, and in general it was much higher than
previously. . .. "" Several other studies have confirmed the
greatly increased accuracy of DSM III.100
Moreover, disagreement over diagnosis of a particular pa-
tient's condition does not necessarily render treatment impossi-
ble. Some treatments benefit more than one condition;101 some
95 TASK FORCE ON NOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS I (1952).
See 1 A. FREEMAN, H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK, supra note 77, at 1071.
"TASK FORCE ON NOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS, AMERICAN PsYcHITRc
ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 11 (1967).
"I See note 90 supra.
98 TASK FORCE ON NOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS I1 (1980).
" Spitzer, Williams & Skodol, DSM III: The Major Achievements and an
Overview, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 151, 154 (1980) (describing the reliability
study as the largest ever conducted). See generally R. SPrrzER, A. SKODAL, M.
GIBBON & J. WILLIAMS, DSM-III CASE BOOK (1981) (a collection of cases to
illustrate application of DSM III).
100 See, e.g., Helzer, Brockington & Kendell, Predictive Validity of DSM III
and Feighner's Definitions of Schizophrenia, 38 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
971 (1981) (DSM III very specific in prediction of outcome); Stangler & Printz,
DSM-III: Psychiatric Diagnosis in a University Population, 137 AM. J. Psy-
CHIATRY 937 (1980) (DSM III "holds promise for increasingly discrete, uniform,
and reliable identification of clinical entities"); Webb, Gold, Johnstone &
DiClemente, Accuracy of DSM III Diagnoses Following a Training Program,
138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 376 (1981) (DSM III was 74.2% accurate, with 11%
near-misses; overall accuracy is relatively high and very encouraging). See also
Morey, The Differences Between Psychologists and Psychiatrists in the Use of
DSM-III, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1123 (1980) (no significant difference was
found in the two professions' "perception of DSM-III symptom importance").
1"I E.g., Post & Bunney, Progress in Psychopharmacology, 19 CURRENT PSY-
CHIATRIC THERAPIES 69, 77, 79 (1980) (lithium primarily used to treat manic-
depressive disorders, but may sometimes be used in schizophrenia).
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illnesses are "mixed," requiring more than one form of treat-
ment.102 Chief Justice Burger's uncertainty-of-diagnosis argu-
ment has therefore lost much of its original force.
3. Patient Cooperation
The Chief Justice's third reason for not recognizing the right
to treatment is that "it is universally acknowledged as funda-
mental to effective therapy that the patient acknowledge his ill-
ness and cooperate with those attempting to give treatment. [A]
large portion of mentally ill persons . . ." do not do so.'03 Chief
Justice Burger derived support for this contention from Profes-
sor Katz' The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fic-
tion?,10" in which Katz stated that in psychotherapy a patient's
consent is necessary. '0 Yet, Katz also stated that "organic ther-
apies . . . can bring about changes . . . in a patient's behavior
without his cooperation." 10 6 Today drug therapy is the preferred
treatment for most mental illnesses, including schizophrenia and
manic-depression.1 0 7 Thus, Chief Justice Burger's statement re-
garding the necessity of cooperation was not completely accurate
at the time of the O'Connor decision and is even less so today.
C. Institutional and Doctrinal Arguments, and the
Possibility of Abuse
A third group of objections concerns the doctrinal standing of
a right to treatment, the danger that government will. abuse a
treatment requirement, and the institutional ability of courts to
10, For a discussion of treatment of "mixed" illnesses, see A. LUDWIG, PRIN-
CIPLES OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 367 (1980). Of course, overmedication must be
avoided. See id. at 362.
103 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J., con-
curring).
104 36 U. CH. L. REv. 755 (1969).
105 Id. at 777.
106 Id. But see A. LuDwIG, supra note 102, at 358 (optimal therapeutic man-
agement requires the full cooperation of the patient).
10" See notes 77, 83-85 and accompanying text supra. See also L. KOLB,
MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 428-29 (9th ed. 1977) (drugs were the "primary
therapeutic agents" for treating serious disturbances of personality); 2 A.
FREEMAN, H. KAPLAN & B. SADOCK, supra note 77, at 1922 (drugs more effec-
tive than psychotherapy alone in treatment of schizophrenia); A. LUDWIG,
supra note 102, at 368, 380 (electroshock or drug treatment for major
disorders).
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1. Doctrinal Objections
Chief Justice Burger argues that proponents of a right to
treatment, particularly those who proceed on a quid pro quo
theory,10 8 are guilty of legal alchemy.10 9 That alchemy consists of
transforming what are essentially procedural guarantees, those
of substantive and procedural due process, into a substantive
right to treatment. 110 The Chief Justice further argues that, even
if this transformation were possible, it would not yield a right to
treatment. Due process is a flexible requirement, varying from
context to context; it cannot generate a uniform substantive re-
quirement such as treatment."1
a. Procedure-into-Substance
Right to treatment proponents have emphasized the reduced
level of due process protections afforded in mental commitment
proceedings.1 2 Proponents have also concluded by urging a con-
108 See, e.g., Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated
and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216-18 (E.D. La. 1976); Mor-
gan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1135-36 (S.D. Miss. 1977); Martarella v. Kel-
ley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 599-600 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp.
781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), rev'd in part, remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (cases discussing quid pro quo theory
of right to treatment).
100 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 586-87 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
110 Id. at 587.
It is too well established to require extended discussion that due
process is not an inflexible concept .... The quid pro quo theory
is a sharp departure from, and cannot coexist with, due process
principles . . . [T]he theory presupposes that essentially the same
interests are involved in every situation where a State seeks to con-
fine an individual; that assumption, however, is incorrect ...
[Further, the theory] would elevate a concern for essentially proce-
dural safeguards into a new substantive constitutional right.
Id. at 585-87 (footnotes omitted).
1's Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971), rev'd in part,
remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974);
Comment, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77
YALE L.J. 87, 87 n.1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Civil Restraint]. But see
Ferlegger & Boyd, Anti-Institutionalization: The Promise of the Pennhurst
Case, 31 STAN. L. REV. 717, 734 (1979).
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stitutional right to treatment. They reason as follows:
1. Society does not wish to treat the mentally ill as convicted
criminals, i.e., by simply confining them;" 8
2. Treatment is the principal way by which the confinement of the
mentally ill is distinguished from penal confinement;1
3. The treatment of the involuntarily committed mentally ill is
what legitimates commitment without the usual due process pro-
tections accompanying criminal incarceration;"5
4. Therefore, unless treatment is provided, civil commitment vio-
lates due process.'"
This reasoning does not result in "converting" procedure into
substance. It does presuppose that due process protections may
be adjusted in light of the substantive right at stake. 117 The re-
duced procedural protections accompanying civil commitment
are permissible because of a past undertaking-to treat civil
commitment differently from criminal incarceration. The
changed procedural requirements are thus only a reflection, not
the source, of the right to treatment.
Moreover, both are aimed at the same goal-the protection of
liberty, or opportunity for freedom.118 They are conceptually re-
lated through a common objective; their "equivalence," if any is
needed, may be judged by their relative effectiveness in promot-
ing the common goal. Thus, if the Chief Justice is concerned
with a quid pro quo rationale that relies on an exchange of pro-
cedural rights, where the difficulty in assessing equivalence is
greatest, his objection is overstated.
b. Varying quid, uniform quo.
Chief Justice Burger also takes issue with the quid pro quo
theory " for deriving a uniform right to treatment from a flex-
os Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1966); D. WEXLER,
MENTAL HEALTH LAW 23, 33-34 (1981) (procedural protection during commit-
ment process); Civil Restraint, supra note 112, at 87 n.2.
" Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
" Id; Civil Restraint, supra note 112, at 87.
Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
17 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 585 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 10-13 to -15 (1978).
US See notes 176-187, 246-253 and accompanying text infra.
" This theory was first used in connection with the right to treatment in
Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and re-
manded, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975) (right to treatment arises in mental commit-
ment because the "three central limitations" on government's power to detain
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ible due process standard. 120 Due process protection varies from
context to context, depending on the right at stake, the type of
proceeding, the characteristics of the parties, and other fac-
tors.121 According to Chief Justice Burger, to derive a substan-
tive remedy for all contexts from a source that differs from one
context to another cannot be correct; the quid pro quo theory
converts due process into an inflexible concept, 22 a "variable"
into a "constant."
The right to treatment theory, however, does not derive the
right from the procedural protections that accompany commit-
ment.1 23 The substantive right to treatment derives from basic
intuitions about what constitutes civilized treatment of the men-
tally ill. 2 Moreover, the treatment afforded mental patients
under a right to treatment is not unvarying. Some will receive
drug therapy, others behavioral therapy; still others will receive
group therapy or individual analysis, or be relocated outside the
institution. 2 The Chief Justice errs, then, both in characteriz-
ing the source of the right to treatment and in asserting that the
right is incommensurable with the mistakenly identified source.
2. Possibility of Abuse
Chief Justice Burger's next objection suggests that the quid
pro quo theory creates the potential for governmental abuse be-
cause it would allow a state to confine any individual so long as
are absent, calling for rehabilitation as a substitute).
120 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 586 (1975) (Burger, C.J., con-
curring).
121 L. TRiBE, supra note 117, §§ 10-13 to -15.
122 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 586 (1975) (Burger, C.J., con-
curring).
123 See text accompanying notes 112-113 supra.
124 Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (confinement with-
out treatment is "shocking"); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D.
Ala. 1971) (to deprive any citizen of his liberty upon the altruistic theory that
the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then to fail to provide
adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process), rev'd in
part, remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974). See also Civil Restraint, supra note 112, at 87.
125 See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (mental
inmates have a right to individualized treatment that will give them a realistic
opportunity to become cured), rev'd in part, remanded in part sub nom. Wy-
att v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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the state provided treatment.126 This concern is again based on a
misreading of the right to treatment. The right would not make
anyone committable simply on a showing that treatment would
be provided. Indeed, recognizing the right would not require any
change in the standards of mental commitment. These stan-
dards, which generally require grave disability or danger to one-
self or others,'27 would remain intact. As the majority opinion
specifically indicated, "[mI]ere public intolerance or animosity
cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's
physical liberty. . . . [A] state cannot constitutionally confine
without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of sur-
viving safely in freedom. . ". ."I  Thus, the Chief Justice's fear
that a sane, though troublesome, person could be put away is
groundless. As always, the state must show that the confinement
of an individual serves a legitimate state interest. The right to
treatment would merely require that persons committed after a
proceeding determining the state's interest be afforded treat-
ment.
If the Chief Justice's concern is that procedural safeguards
will deteriorate upon recognition of a right to treatment, that
concern seems groundless in the light of experience. States and
circuits that have imposed a right to treatment have not suc-




Chief Justice Burger's final objection is that courts are ill-
suited to enforce and administer a right to treatment. "' Such a
126 "[The quid pro quo] theory may be read to permit a State to confine an
individual simply because it is willing to provide treatment, regardless of the
subject's ability to function in society. . . ." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 585 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
127 Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1203-05 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the
Law].
1'8 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975) (Burger, C.J., con-
curring).
"I Indeed, the trend is toward expanding procedural protections in civil
commitment cases. A comprehensive review of state and federal statutory
schemes and case law discloses no such relationship. See B. ENNIS & R. EMERY,
THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS (3d ed. 1978).
131 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 587 (1975) (Burger, C.J., con-
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right will inevitably require some degree of judicial intervention
in matters of institutional administration. 13 1 Judges may be re-
quired to choose among available therapies and to decide which
patient receives which type of treatment. Because of the "wide
divergence of medical opinions regarding. . . diagnosis. . . and
therapy,'31 2 the Chief Justice argues that such decisions are best
left to institutional administrators and psychiatrists, or to the
legislature.3 s This is particularly true, he maintains, because
judges can adjudicate a right to treatment only as a trade-off for
lost procedural protections. Judges should be slow to sacrifice
the essential protection of due process in favor of the uncertain
benefit of treatment.
The Chief Justice's argument for deference to psychiatric ex-
pertise is in tension, however, with his view that psychiatric
knowledge is too rudimentary to support a right to treatment.' 4
An argument for judicial deference is strongest in connection
with a highly technical field of knowledge about which courts
cannot be expected to make intelligent decisions.'3 If psychiat-
ric expertise is not highly advanced, as Chief Justice Burger
maintains, then the argument for deference weakens. Any alter-
native decisionmaker would be just as hampered as the courts in
deciding the appropriate level of treatment.
Courts should weigh a number of factors when deciding to ad-
judicate in a given area. These include the importance of the
interest at stake, 6 the availability of nonjudicial remedies,'
3 7
the likelihood that erroneous decisions will be corrected in the
democratic marketplace, 33 and any alternative decisionmaker's
impartiality, legitimacy, and ability to discern relevant facts.'39
curring).
'31 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785-86 (M.D. Ala. 1971)
(setting out a detailed order and requirements for treatment), rev'd in part,
remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
See also Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379-86 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (Appen-
dix A).
132 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 587 (1975) (Burger, C.J., con-
curring).
133 Id.
I See notes 77-88 and accompanying text supra.
115 See notes 138, 143-148 and accompanying text infra.
136 P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 982 (1975).
137 Id. at 981-82.
138 Id. at 981.
'3 Id. at 982-83.
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With the possible exception of the last, none of these factors
requires deference to institutional authority. The decisions of
hospital and asylum administrators regarding treatment are not
readily reviewable by the courts. Further, because of the low vis-
ibility and relative helplessness of mental patients, these deci-
sions are not easily corrected by legislatures. The interest at
stake is very important; treatment or its absence may have a
grave impact on an individual's comfort, health, well-being, and
liberty. "1 0 Although many hospital administrators are conscien-
tious physicians who make treatment decisions humanely and
impartially, abuses have occurred.14 ' Moreover, because adminis-
trators are less accountable than judges and are selected in a less
visible manner, their institutional legitimacy is not as high.1
42
Institutional administrators and psychiatrists are, however, in
a better position than courts to ascertain facts about particular
patients and their treatment needs. They have more immediate
access to the patients' records and greater familiarity with devel-
opments in psychiatric theory and practice than do courts. They
are also better able to monitor the effectiveness of treatment. On
the other hand, hospital personnel may be under economic pres-
sures not to treat patients. For instance, successful treatment
might require the release of an inmate who is performing useful
institutional labor.
143
Yet, courts are not without some resources for ascertaining
relevant facts. Courts may periodically assess patients' pro-
140 Lack of treatment may prevent an individual from living a productive or
self-fulfilling life, and may instead cause him to further isolate himself from
society, resulting perhaps eventually in a chronic and helpless state of mental
dysfunction.
141 Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101
S. Ct. 2313 (1981) (No. 80-1429, 1981 Term) (patient was severely injured in
many fights, suffered from inadequate medical attention, inadequate sanita-
tion, and had been shackled to a bed or chair for long periods daily); New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (over 1300 reported injuries, assaults, and fights in one year),
see notes 155-158 and accompanying text infra; Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.
Supp. 781, 782-84 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (improper categorization of patients, un-
derstaffed conditions), rev'd in part, remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
112 This is particularly true when judges are elected to the bench. See P.
DuBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH (1980).
143 See generally B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS
159-60 (3d ed. 1978).
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gress.'" Courts may call expert psychiatric witnesses,145 or
consult with appointed panels of expert psychiatrists and psy-
chologists. 14 They may also appoint a fact-finding master or ref-
eree. 47 The ascertainment-of-facts problem, then, seems neither
theoretically nor practically insuperable. This seems particularly
true given that under most theories of right to treatment, courts
need not decide whether the patient receives the "best. . .pos-
sible treatment," but only whether he obtains "carefully chosen
therapy . . . (falling] within the range of . . . treatment
alternatives. '" 148
In conclusion, Chief Justice Burger's "medical objections,"
while having some support in 1975 when he concurred in
O'Connor v. Donaldson, are no longer valid. Treatment and
cure, the primary goals of confinement, are at least partially at-
tainable. Psychiatric diagnosis is more accurate. In addition,
Chief Justice Burger bases his institutional and doctrinal argu-
ments on a misreading of the arguments advanced by propo-
nents of the right to treatment. Therefore, the Chief Justice's
objections in O'Connor should not prevent the Supreme Court
from establishing a right to treatment for the institutionalized.
The Court's remaining problem is deciding how to derive such a
right from existing principles.
II. THEORETICAL BASES OF A RIGHT TO TREATMENT
When Chief Justice Burger wrote his concurrence in O'Connor
144 Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1966); New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 769
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
145 FED. R. EvID. 706(a) (Court's power to appoint experts).
4I Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971), rev'd in part,
remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
147 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (courts' power to appoint masters).
14" Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHi. L. REv. 742,
745 (1969). See also Developments in the Law, supra note 127. Under this
"administrative model" of review, courts only "determine whether the profes-
sionals ... have made responsible decisions based on a thorough consideration
of all the evidence relevant to the individual case." Bazelon, supra, at 748.
This narrower model of review permits judges to scrutinize treatment decisions
without taking on the role of expert psychiatric diagnostician. The concern
about judicial usurpation is further mitigated by the circumstance that many
right-to-treatment cases will arise in settings where the failure to treat is bla-
tant and institution-wide, calling for little, if any, individualized review of the
needs of particular patients. See, e.g., cases cited in note 3 supra.
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v. Donaldson, right to treatment proponents principally relied
on the quid pro quo theory.'4 9 Recent decisions and commentary
have developed three additional theoretical grounds: Protection
from harm, equal protection, and the least restrictive alternative
doctrine. This section outlines these three theories and evaluates
the extent to which they are vulnerable to Chief Justice Burger's
objections. In addition, it proposes a fourth theory, a "theoreti-
cal maximum duration of confinement."
A. Protection from Harm
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 5*
and its related consent judgment, New York State Ass'n for Re-
tarded Children v. Carey,'15 developed protection from harm as
a basis for a right to treatment for involuntary committees.
Under this theory, an inmate in a state institution has a right to
protection from physical assaults and inhumane living condi-
tions. By extension, this right requires treatment to maintain an
inmate's physical integrity.
The New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children '5 litigation
arose out of allegations of substandard living conditions at the
Willowbrook State School for the Mentally Retarded.'58 Sev-
enty-three percent of the inmates at the school were there on
court order; over three quarters were severely retarded.' " Re-
ports dating back to 1964 had complained of overcrowding and
inadequate staffing, and by the time litigation commenced in
1972, the conditions at Willowbrook had deteriorated dramati-
cally. 55 The testimony of parents and officials revealed extensive
physical danger to the inmates, with over 1300 reported inci-
dents of injury, assaults, and fights in 1972 alone. 15 6 On these
facts, the Rockefeller court found no constitutional basis for a
right to treatment. 5 7 The court did find, however, that the re-
149 See Spece, Preserving the Right to Treatment, 20 ARnz. L. REv. 1, 4
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Spece I].
1 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
151 New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752, 758-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
"I Id. at 755-56.
'5 Id. at 756.
16 Id.
14 Id.
157 Id. at 764.
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sidents had a right to be protected from harm. "One of the basic
rights of a person in confinement is protection from assaults by
fellow inmates or by staff. . . . Another is the correction of the
conditions which 'violate basic standards of human decency.' """
Thus, the right to protection from harm incorporated protection
from physical assaults and inhumane living conditions.
The relief granted, however, resulted from the court's narrow
reading of the right to protection from harm. It included a pro-
hibition against seclusion, an order to hire additional staff, and
an order to contract with a hospital for medical services. The
order did not include medical screening, a basic treatment ele-
ment, because it related "to the right to treatment rather than
to the right to protection from harm."'' 1 9
In New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey,""
the parties to the Willowbrook litigation agreed to a consent
judgment that expanded the Rockefeller reading of the right to
protection from harm. The judgment recognized that "protec-
tion from harm requires relief more extensive than this court
originally contemplated, because harm can result not only from
neglect but from conditions which cause regression or which pre-
vent development of an individual's capabilities."'' Thus, "a
certain level of affirmative intervention and programming is nec-
essary if that capacity for growth is to be preserved, and regres-
sion prevented.'' The court concluded that the effects of the
right to protection from harm were similar to those of a right to
treatment: "The relief the parties agreed to will advance the
very rights enunciated in the [right to treatment] case law since
this court's 1973 ruling." s Thus, protection from harm requires
treatment that will at least maintain the patient's condition.
1. Constitutional Basis of the Right to Protection from Harm
The Rockefeller court did not identify a single constitutional
basis for finding the right to protection from harm. Rather, it
stated that the right could rest on the eighth amendment, the
due process clause, or the equal protection clause of the four-
158 Id. at 764-65.
159 Id. at 769.
160 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
161 Id. at 718.
165 Id. at 717 (quoting from Appendix to Proposed Consent Judgment).
163 Id. at 719.
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teenth amendment. 1" Of these, the eighth amendment fails in
civil commitment cases because it protects only those convicted
of a crime. Under a due process analysis, which may require a
right to treatment, there are no clear guidelines for establishing
minimum standards of protection.
a. The Eighth Amendment
The eighth amendment guarantees that government will not
inflict cruel and unusual punishment.16" Failure to protect
mental inmates from physical injury or disease might be consid-
ered a violation of this constitutional prohibition. Cases citing
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children have generally in-
terpreted that decision as basing the right to protection from
harm on this ground.1"
Robinson v. California"' has also provided an eighth amend-
ment basis for the right to treatment. In Robinson, the United
States Supreme Court held that a statute declaring drug addic-
tion to be a crime constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
the absence of treatment, because the punishment was for a sta-
tus, and not a crime.'"s Commentators have argued by analogy
that civil commitment without treatment is cruel and unusual
punishment, applied because of an individual's status as men-
tally ill.1
69
It is clear, however, that the eighth amendment does not ap-
ply to the mentally ill. The Supreme Court recently indicated
that the amendment applies only to persons convicted of a
crime.10 Thus, although Rockefeller and Robinson have sug-
I" New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752, 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
16 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
" New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752, 764 (1973). Language in Rockefeller suggests parallels to criminal
cases: "The cases dealing with prison conditions reflect a balance between the
requirements of humane treatment and the necessary loss of rights ... follows
incarceration for a criminal offense. . . . [Willowbrook residents] must be enti-
tled to at least the same living conditions as prisoners." Id. at 764. "Prisoners
may not be denied medical care . I." d. at 765.
167 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
16 Id. at 666-67.
, Spece I, supra note 149, at 17 n.59 (listing authorities for assertion that
eighth amendment-based right to treatment exists).
fo Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1978). See also Romeo v. Youngberg, 644
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gested parallels to the criminal context,71 the Supreme Court
has effectively removed the foundation for those suggestions.
b. Due Process
Although the eighth amendment fails as a basis for a right to
protection from harm, the deprivation of life172 or liberty
clause173 of the fourteenth amendment might guarantee this
right.
(i) Deprivation of Life
The deprivation of life clause might apply in several situa-
tions. For example, the lives of persons confined in mental insti-
tutions and surrounded by dangerous patients may be
threatened in the absence of proper security measures. Lack of
medical care and indecent living conditions may also endanger a
patient's life. Furthermore, improperly supervised suicidal pa-
tients could take their own lives.
1 7 4
If the state commits an individual, precipitating these dan-
gers, the state must protect the patient. 5 Failure to do so would
violate the due process clause, in that the state's action would
endanger life without due process. Even when the state commits
a mentally ill person who is very dangerous to society, it is diffi-
cult to justify confining him and then denying him the right to
protection and medical care. Thus, one basis for the right to pro-
tection from harm is the fourteenth amendment's proscription
F.2d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2313 (1981) (No. 80-1429,
1981 Term); Philipp v. Carey, 517 F. Supp. 513, 517 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (because
of Bell, the eighth amendment cannot apply to civil committees). But see
Flakes v. Percy, 511 F. Supp. 1325 (W.D. Wis. 1981).
1 See note 166 supra.
172 See Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977).
178 See Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted,
101 S. Ct. 2313 (1981) (No. 80-1429, 1981 Term).
174 Harper v. Cserr, 544 F.2d 1121 (1st Cir. 1976) (after long history of sui-
cide attempts, patient hung herself).
175 Cf. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357
F. Supp. 752, 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (patients have right to basic hygiene, ade-
quate heat, and medical attention). The theory was referred to with approval
in Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1321
(E.D. Pa. 1977) and in Woe v. Mathews, 408 F. Supp. 419, 428-29 (E.D.N.Y.
1976). The theory also has been relied upon in the prison context. See Spece I,
supra note 149, at 29 n.96.
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against deprivation of life without due process.
(ii) Deprivation of Liberty
The liberty clause of the fourteenth amendment provides two
due process bases for the right to protection from harm. The
first is the right to maintain physical and mental health, and to
prevent regression of disease or injury.1'7 The second is the right
to be free to protect oneself from assault or punishment and to
live in a secure environment.
1 7
Institutionalized mental patients lack many fundamental free-
doms. They are confined in institutions, often involuntarily, and
must comply with institutional restrictions. 7 8 Typically, com-
mitted patients are required to give up rights to come and go as
they please, to live where they choose, to enjoy privacy, and to
exercise a host of other freedoms that nonconfined people take
for granted.' 79 "A valid involuntary commitment ex necessitate
extinguishes a retarded person's right to freedom from confine-
ment. Nevertheless, a residuum of liberty remains that is enti-
tled to due process protection.' 80
It would be difficult to justify the state's taking away from the
involuntarily committed the right to obtain medical help, to live
in a clean and secure environment, and to avoid assaults. If this
were, in fact, justified, the evidentiary standard in commitment
proceedings would have to be much higher.'' Since confinement
may preclude the patient's exercise of these residual rights, the
state has a duty to protect them. The state, in confining a pa-
tient, should make all reasonable efforts to maintain for the pa-
tient any freedom possible.8 2 To this end, the patient should be
170 New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752, 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
177 Id.
178 B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 36 (1973).
179 Id.
I" Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 159 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101
S. Ct. 2313 (1981).
181 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) ("beyond reasonable doubt"
standard of evidence used in criminal cases rejected on grounds that civil com-
mitment is not punitive in nature, and committee may benefit from
commitment).
I"s Alternatively, this argument could be viewed as another aspect of the
least restrictive alternative analysis. See text accompanying notes 246-255
infra.
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afforded the right to protection from harm.
A second aspect of the fourteenth amendment's liberty clause
is the right to freedom from punishment.18 Although the eighth
amendment does not protect the institutionalized mentally ill,
patients do enjoy the right to freedom from punishment that all
persons hold until convicted of a crime.18 However, courts have
so narrowly defined the concept of punishment that the right to
freedom from punishment will not encompass a right to treat-
ment for the mentally ill. An institution's action is not deemed
punishment if it is not intended to be punishment; it is ration-
ally related to an institutional need, such as security, order, or
discipline; it is promulgated by the informed judgment of the
institution's administrators; and it is not an exaggerated re-
sponse to legitimate institutional needs. 8 5 In addition, courts
are reluctant to label an action punishment if it results in little
or no discomfort for the inmate.186 Applying this standard might
well proscribe some of the worst conditions in mental institu-
tions, 1 87 but it would not provide a basis for a right to treatment.
Punishment as currently defined is not broad enough to include
failure to provide treatment.
c. Equal Protection in the Protection from Harm Theory
Equal protection as a basis for the right to protection from
harm is usually premised on "irrational discrimination between
prisoners and innocent mentally [disabled] persons."" Since
the criminally confined have the right to protection from
harm,18 9 mental inmates should have the right as well.' 0
183 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
184 Id.
188 See, e.g., Beckett v. Powers, 494 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Wis. 1980).
186 See Flakes v. Percy, 511 F. Supp. 1325 (W.D. Wis. 1981).
187 See, e.g., id. (confinement with inadequate toilet facilities).
188 New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752, 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
189 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
190 To determine whether two classes are similarly situated, and thus enti-
tled to equal protection of the laws, one must look to the purpose of the state
action. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 520 (1978).
See notes 206-243 and accompanying text infra. The applicable standard of
review is the rational relationship test. L. TRsaE, supra note 117, at 994-97;
Spece I, supra note 149, at 7 n.25, 10 n.33. Although the judicial trend is to
give broad meaning to the rational relationship test, see, e.g., United States
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The right to protection from harm has been extended to crim-
inal prisoners because prisons are inherently dangerous and in-
mates are unable to protect themselves.191 The right includes
reasonable medical and psychological care for injuries suffered
while in prison 92 or even before incarceration. 193 The purpose of
the right to protection from harm is to protect persons who, be-
cause of state action, find themselves in dangerous situations,
unable to protect themselves or to obtain medical treatment.
Persons committed to mental institutions may suffer similar
injuries and illnesses requiring medical care.'" Thus, criminal
inmates and mental patients are similarly dangerously situated
and need protection from harm.
The state might seek to justify the provision of treatment to
the criminally confined, but not to those confined for mental dis-
orders, on several grounds. For example, it could be argued that
the purpose of affording criminal inmates protection from harm
is not to benefit them, but to help maintain prison security."95
Courts have consistently rejected this construction, however.'"
The state might also argue that physical conditions are worse in
prisons than in mental hospitals, so that criminal inmates need a
R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Sterling v. Harris, 478 F.
Supp. 1046 (N.D. Ill. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Schweiker v. Wilson, 101 S. Ct.
1074 (1981), it is not a "toothless standard." Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
510 (1976). See Barrett, The Rational Basis Standard for Equal Protection
Review of Ordinary Legislative Classifications, 68 Ky. L.J. 845, 860 (1979).
The state's arguments for disparate treatment of mental and criminal inmates
are weak. See text accompanying notes 197-198 infra. Mental inmates should
therefore receive the same degree of protection from harm as prisoners.
191 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Madyun v. Thompson, 657
F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1981); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 46-47 (4th Cir.
1977); Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973); Holt v. Sarver, 442
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Penn v. Oliver, 351 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1972).
19 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Bowring v. Godwin, 551
F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977); Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975). The right to medical care arises whether the
condition arose before or after confinement began. See note 206 infra.
193 See Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977).
194 Id.
15 Id. See also New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rocke-
feller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); notes 150-159 and accompanying text
supra.
" See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d
44 (4th Cir. 1977); Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
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right to protection from harm, whereas mental patients do
not.' 7 This argument fails, however, when one looks at actual
hospital conditions, which may be "much more stern and dreary
than exist in many medium and light security correctional insti-
tutions." ' " The mentally ill and the criminally confined are
therefore similarly situated and equally entitled to protection
from harm.
2. Protection from Harm as a Source of a Right to
Treatment
Under equal protection theory, mental inmates would have a
right to treatment equal to that provided prisoners. Prisoners
have both a right to protection from harm and a right to obtain
treatment for physical or mental diseases or for injuries that are
curable and might cause substantial harm. 99 Mental patients
should have a similar right.20 0 As with prisoners, treatment of
mental patients should be "limited to that which may be pro-
vided upon a reasonable cost and time basis . .. the essential
test [being one] of medical necessity."'0 Treatment would be
"only the modicum. . . necessary to maintain the patient's de-
bilitated condition at the moment of confinement."2 2
If the right to protection from harm were based on the depri-
vation of life clause, treatment would be mandated when failure
to provide it would endanger the mental patient's life. The state
1" See, e.g., E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961), quoted in Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305, 1312 n.8 (5th Cir. 1974) (commitment proceedings are for the conve-
nience of relatives, police, and judges). But see Foote, Comments on Prevent-
ative Detention, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 48, 51-52 (1970).
'" Flakes v. Percy, 511 F. Supp. 1325, 1333 (W.D. Wis. 1981). See also
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d
147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2313 (1981); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L.
Rzv. 1134, 1146 (1967).
1" See notes 189-193 and accompanying text supra.
200 It might be claimed that prisoners have only a right to treatment for
those injuries or diseases suffered while incarcerated, and that the mentally ill
should not be afforded the same right because they entered the institution
with the ailment. Failure to provide treatment to prisoners injured before in-
carceration, however, would be cruel and unusual punishment. See Hughes v.
Noble, 295 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1961) (prisoner incarcerated after automobile
accident).
'0' Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47-48 (4th Cir. 1977).
,o Spece I, supra note 149, at 32.
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could avoid providing treatment by protecting a patient's life in
other ways, such as increasing the security staff or by removing
dangerous objects from the patient's vicinity. A more expansive
right results, however, if the right to treatment is derived from
liberty considerations. Confinement without treatment precludes
any treatment the patient might have obtained had he been
outside the institution. To infringe as little as possible on the
patient's liberty, the state should provide comparable treatment.
The parameters of a right based on the liberty clause are
unclear.
B. Equal Protection
Right to treatment cases have generally avoided equal protec-
tion analysis. A few cases have mentioned equal protection as a
possible basis for the right to treatment;203 others have raised
and dismissed it with little analysis.2" Equal protection, how-
ever, does merit attention because it is a traditional mode of
constitutional analysis and avoids some of the doctrinal and
practical pitfalls of other approaches. 0 5
The fourteenth amendment requires that persons similarly
situated be given equal protection of the laws.'" The normal
standard of judicial review for a state's disparate treatment of
similarly situated persons is the rational relationship test.
0 7 If
suspect classifications or fundamental interests are present, how-
ever, the standard of review is one of heightened scrutiny. 08 Fi-
nally, an intermediate standard has been used recently to review
quasi-suspect classifications and some protected interests.2
9
Equal protection analysis in the mental health area can focus
on several classifications: physical versus mental illness;'10 civilly
versus criminally committed persons; 11 or the mentally ill ver-
103 E.g., Philipp v. Carey, 517 F. Supp. 513 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
20, See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefel-
ler, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
106 See notes 165-171 and accompanying text supra (eighth amendment in-
applicable to mental patients); notes 200-202 and accompanying text supra
(due process leads to uncertain protection of the right to treatment).
:o6 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & T. YOUNG, supra note 190, at 517.
0'7 See Williams v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
108 See, e.g., L. TRiBE, supra note 117, at 1000-19.
,09 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 192, at 524.
s10 See, e.g., Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979).
21 See text accompanying notes 188-198 supra.
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sus the general population. The following analysis focuses on the
latter classification.
Under the rational relationship test, confinement must bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective.
212
States commonly give three purposes for involuntary commit-
ment of mentally ill persons: (1) Some are dangerous to society
and must be confined to prevent them from harming others; (2)
some are dangerous to themselves and unless cared for will harm
themselves either actively or passively; and (3) some need treat-
ment.21 3 O'Connor v. Donaldson2"' left unanswered the question
of whether custodial confinement of the mentally ill adequately
promotes these or any other "police power" objectives. 15 A prin-
cipal difficulty is that the classification of mentally ill persons
versus the general population is both under- and over-inclusive
with respect to these goals.
Many persons who are mentally ill are not dangerous to them-
selves or others;16 other individuals are dangerous but not men-
tally ill. Treatment for mental illness, however, is something
from which virtually all mentally ill persons, both dangerous and
212 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 190, at 524; L. TaME,
supra note 117, at 994-97.
218 Spece 1, supra note 149, at 6.
2.4 442 U.S. 563 (1975). The Supreme Court held that the state could not
constitutionally confine a nondangerous mentally ill person who had the ability
to live safely outside the institution:
A finding of "mental illness" alone cannot justify a State's locking
a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple
custodial confinement. Assuming that the term can be given a rea-
sonably precise content and that the "mentally ill" can be identi-
fied with reasonable accuracy, there is still no basis for confining
such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can
live safely in freedom.
Id. at 575.
Justice Stewart's holding was aimed both at the purpose of commitment and
the means employed to serve this purpose. He dismissed any argument that
commitment was essential to afford the petitioner a superior living standard
because incarceration is "rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising the
living standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom, on their own
or with the help of family and friends." Id. Moreover, the Court rejected mere
improvement of a person's quality of life as a compelling interest. Id.
216 Developments in the Law, supra note 127, at 1207-45 (origins and appli-
cations of state's police and parens patriae power). But see Flakes v. Percy,
511 F. Supp. 1325 (W.D. Wis. 1981).
211 See notes 195-198 supra, note 242 and accompanying text infra.
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non-dangerous, can benefit.117 Thus, the classification fits only if
the state's objective is treatment.21 8 Nonetheless, the present
classification scheme will probably be upheld, because under the
rational relationship test the state need only show'a conceivable
relationship to a legitimate state goal."" However, if "mental ill-
ness" is a suspect or quasi-suspect classification,220 or if civil
commitment amounts to an unjustified infringement on pro-
tected liberty,2 some form of heightened scrutiny is required.
There is no consistency of judicial opinion on whether mental
illness is a suspect classification. 2' The Supreme Court has
avoided the issue. 223 There is a strong argument in favor of hold-
ing the mental illness classification to be quasi-suspect."4 A
quasi-suspect class is one whose members share some of the in-
dicia of suspectness, and "bear enough resemblance to. . . mi-
norities to warrant more than casual judicial response when they
are injured by law. 22 5 Mentally ill persons do share certain
characteristics with persons in traditional suspect classifica-
tions. 6 The indicia of suspect classes vary. One is "an immuta-
217 See generally notes 81-82 and accompanying text supra.
218 Developments in the Law, supra note 127, at 1329-30; Note, Wyatt v.
Stickney, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1282, 1293-96 (1973). See Simpson, Mental Illness:
A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974).
219 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.-YOUNG, supra note 190, at 524.
22 See notes 221-238 and accompanying text-infra.
"' See notes 177-187 and accompanying text infra.
' See Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979); Flakes v. Percy, 511 F.
Supp. 1325 (W.D. Wis. 1981); Sterling v. Harris, 478 F. Supp. 1046 (N.D. Ill.
1979), rev'd sub nom. Schweiker v. Wilson, 101 S. Ct. 1074 (1981); New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y.
1975); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752 (ED.N.Y. 1973).
Is Schweiker v. Wilson, 101 S. Ct. 1074 (1981). In one case, the Court
granted summary affirmance of a case holding the rational relation test appli-
cable in reviewing a statute that gave benefits to physically ill persons while
denying them to the mentally ill. See Legion v. Weinberger, 414 U.S. 1058
(1973). The precedential value of the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of
Legion has been interpreted differently. See Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3d
Cir. 1979); Sterling v. Harris, 478 F. Supp. 1046 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd sub nom.
Schweiker v. Wilson, 101 S. Ct. 1074 (1981).
' Simpson, supra note 218.
n5 L. TRBE, supra note 117, at 1090 (footnote omitted).
126 Traditionally, suspect groups include race, religion, alienage, and perhaps
illegitimacy. Id. at 1012, 1052, 1057.
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ble characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth"'""
that "frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or con-
tribute to society. ' 2 8 Another concerns classifications affecting
"discrete and insular minorities . . . unable to express a potent
voice in the political process."22 9 A third looks to groups sub-
jected to "a history of purposeful unequal treatment . . . as to
command extraordinary protection . . .,"2s or subjected to a
"stigma of inferiority and badge of opprobrium. "121
Some types of mental illness and mental retardation are cer-
tainly "immutable characteristic[s] determined . . . by the acci-
dent of birth. '23 2 Other types may not be determined at birth,
but they may well be immutable in the sense of being beyond a
person's control; most mental patients do not choose to become
ill.'83 The second aspect of this indicium of suspect classifica-
tions concerns a person's ability to perform or contribute to soci-
ety. Mentally ill persons often will not meet this test, because
without treatment they are generally unable to function in
society.
3 4
The mentally ill also meet other indicia of suspect classifica-
tions. They have reduced political power. In many states, they
are not allowed to vote.23 5 Shut away in institutions, they exem-
plify the "discrete and insular minorities ' 23 6 that the equal pro-
22 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
2 Id.
229 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
230 San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
281 Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,
424 (1960); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAxv. L. Ra.
1065, 1127 (1969).
23' Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
2" See notes 77, 83-85 and accompanying text supra. But see T. SzAsz, LAw,
LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 215 (1968). For an excellent sociological perspective,
see E. LEMERT, HUMAN DEVIANCE, SOCIAL PROBLEMS, AND SOCIAL CONTROL (2d
ed. 1972).
234 Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979).
Although the mentally ill have been the victims of stereotypes, the
disabilities imposed on them have often reflected that many of
them do have reduced ability for personal relations, for economic
activity, and for political choice .... It is important that the legal
disabilities have been related, even if imperfectly, to real inabilities
from which many of the mentally ill suffer.
Id. at 711.
236 E.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-106(6) (McKinney 1978).
226 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). See
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tection clause should safeguard. Finally, the mentally ill have
been subjected to "a history of .purposeful unequal treat-
ment." 37 Traditionally, persons with mental disabilities have
been stigmatized and have suffered from prejudice and
discrimination.3
Thus, a classification based on "mental illness" is suspect
under most of the indicia of a suspect classification. Although
the Supreme Court "has been hesitant to recognize new suspect
classifications, '"239 the mentally ill bear enough of the character-
istics of suspect classes that they should be accorded at least
quasi-suspect status.2 4
If the mentally ill constitute a quasi-suspect class, state ac-
tions affecting them will have to withstand an intermediate level
of scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, courts should examine
the relationship of means and end, and the closeness of classifi-
catory fit.24 1 Current civil commitment schemes probably fail
these tests because the group burdened is both under- and over-
inclusive.242 However, provision of treatment is an important
state objective, and the "mental illness" classification fits that
purpose exactly.2 3 Thus, under the intermediate level of review,
states may confine the mentally ill for the purpose of providing
treatment. This is not to say that treatment is given in exchange
for the individual's liberty,4 nor does it elevate "a concern for
procedural safeguards into a new, substantial constitutional
right. '245 It simply recognizes that treatment is the only accept-
able rationale for the restraints on freedom that accompany
institutionalization.
also San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
i3 San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (obiter
dicta).
28 See generally E. LEMERT, supra note 233, at 62-101 (discussing "secon-
dary deviations" and legal commitment); E. LEMERT, SociAL PATHOLOGY
(1951); Simpson, supra note 218.
889 Sterling v. Harris, 478 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
240 See L. TRIBE, supra note 117, at 1090.
24 Id. at 1082-91.
842 Simpson, supra note 218.
84 See note 218 supra.
244 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 585 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
248 Id. at 587 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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C. The Least Restrictive Alternative Theory
A constitutional right to treatment for the involuntarily com-
mitted mentally ill can also be based on least restrictive alterna-
tive principles.2 4 Under this theory, the state can achieve its
commitment goals and concurrently minimize intrusion upon in-
dividual liberty. Like the protection from harm and equal pro-
146 This doctrine requires that government action must not intrude upon a
constitutionally protected interest to a degree greater than necessary to
achieve a legitimate purpose:
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and sub-
stantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be
viewed in light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
purposes.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
The most convincing case in favor of applying the least restrictive alterna-
tive theory is O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Although the Court
avoided the issue of a committee's right to treatment, see id. at 573, the case
supports a compelling state interest test. See Grant, Donaldson, Dangerous-
ness, and the Right to Treatment, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 611-14 (1976).
The Court stated that commitment is "rarely if ever a necessary condition for
raising the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom, on
their own or with the help of family or friends." 422 U.S. at 575. The elements
of the least restrictive alternative are shown by the Court's: (1) reliance on
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (setting forth the least restrictive alter-
native test); (2) using least restrictive alternative language, e.g., commitment is
"rarely if ever a necessary condition," 422 U.S. at 575; and (3) using least re-
strictive alternative logic, i.e., reasoning that the state goal of providing care
and assistance would be denied if other methods, like help from family or
friends, would impinge less on individual rights. Spece, Justifying Invigorated
Scrutiny and the Least Restrictive Alternative as a Superior Form of Inter-
mediate Review: Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment as a Case
Study, 21 ARIz. L. R.v. 1049, 1084 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Spece II].
In State v. Sanchez, 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1969), the court had stated
that the least restrictive alternative had no application to civil commitment.
Id. at 441, 457 P.2d at 373. The Supreme Court dismissed Sanchez's appeal
"for want of a substantial federal question." Sanchez v. New Mexico, 396 U.S.
276 (1970). Lower courts, however, have ignored the Supreme Court's dismissal
in Sanchez, and have applied the least restrictive alternative to civil commit-
ment. See, e.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 125 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Halderman v. Pen-
nhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd on
other grounds, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds,
101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216-17 (E.D.
La. 1976); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 501-02 (D. Minn. 1974).
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tection theories, this theoretical basis for a right to treatment
was not well developed when Chief Justice Burger wrote his con-
currence in O'Connor.
Professor Roy G. Spece has formulated the clearest exposition
of a right to treatment theory under least restrictive alternative
analysis.24 7 The theory, which postulates that confinement with
treatment is less intrusive than confinement simpliciter, derives
from three assertions: (1) The right to freedom from confine-
ment is a fundamental interest; (2) as a result, invigorated scru-
tiny is the appropriate standard of review; and (3) under that
standard of review, if the state fails to meet its heavy burden of
proof, it must provide treatment, because confinement with
treatment intrudes less upon the right to freedom from confine-
ment than does simple confinement.
248
2,7 Spece II, supra note 246, at 1049-50. See also Spece I, supra note 149, at
38-39.
s"i The theory assumes that the least restrictive alternative is an indepen-
dent standard of judicial review, one in which the state bears a heavy burden
of proof. While the state need only use equally effective alternative means, it
must not draw overly inclusive classifications, and must use alternative means
that minimize intrusions. Further, the least restrictive alternative principle is a
relatively mild intrusion into the political process, because it does not deny any
state goals. Spece I, supra note 149, at 35.
Each of these assumptions has support. Tradition and precedent favor the
independent use of invigorated scrutiny. It is a well established principle that
has been used in every field of constitutional adjudication, and has been ap-
plied independently in first amendment and commerce clause cases. Spece II,
supra note 246, at 1053-56. Policies on placing the burden of proof indicate
that the state should bear such a burden. Id. at 1057-58. Civil commitment
involves a change of the status quo through a massive deprivation of liberty.
Id. at 1057-58. Also, the state's claim that a person is mentally ill is an asser-
tion of a fact more improbable than not. Id. Civil commitment is a great intru-
sion on a preferred right, the right to freedom from confinement. Finally, be-
cause it operates institutions, the state has better access to information; it
knows who the patients are, what should be done, and it has access to massive
technical resources. Id. at 1058.
The state need only use equally effective alternative means, because any al-
ternative would be too burdensome. On the other hand, the state should not
use overly broad classifications, because the intrusion on one's rights would be
too great. The least restrictive alternative is only a mild intrusion in the politi-
cal process, because only the means are scrutinized. Spece I, supra note 149, at
35. This would merely require the legislature to fashion legislation having a
more specific focus. Spece II, supra note 246, at 1058-59.
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1. The Appropriate Standard of Review
The United States Supreme Court applies a strict standard of
review when the individual right infringed is closely related to
fundamental constitutional interests." 9 Civil commitment sub-
stantially, perhaps irreversibly, 250 intrudes upon an individual's
freedom. It affects personal liberty,' 5' family privacy,25' and
other rights.2 3 Therefore, an invigorated standard of review is
appropriate.
2. Recognizing Conflicting Goals
The least restrictive alternative standard provides a means for
recognizing the state's goals, the needs of individuals, and the
concerns of legislators.2'' The state, as before, may protect its
legitimate interest in confining dangerous or gravely disabled
249 L. TRIBE, supra note 117, at 1000-19. See also Chambers, Alternatives to
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional
Imperatives, 70 MiCH. L. REv. 1108, 1155 (1972).
250 Irreversible intrusions trigger heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Spece II,
supra note 246, at 1074 n.127. Commitment may be irreversible by causing or
accelerating a patient's death. See notes 173-176 and accompanying text supra.
It may also be irreversible if an individual is confined indefinitely or until
death.
25 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one year residency require-
ment to obtain welfare benefits violates fundamental right of interstate travel).
2"2 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (state cannot im-
pose definition of "family" so as to prohibit certain blood relatives from living
together).
'53 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 500 (1977); Spece II, supra note 246. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), the Court applied an invigorated standard of review and recognized
the right to be free from government regulations on contraceptives. Id. at 485.
Invigorated scrutiny was invoked because the right to use contraceptives is
closely related to family privacy and personal liberty. See id. at 485-86.
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court used invigorated scrutiny to
decide the issue of prohibition of abortion. The rule of Roe is the same as that
of Griswold, with the addition of two factors: (1) Invigorated scrutiny may re-
quire a massive or absolute deprivation; and (2) it does not require the pres-
ence of only judicially manageable issues. Spece II, supra note 246, at 1092.
These factors exist in civil commitment cases because confinement is a massive
curtailment of liberty. Moreover, the Supreme Court has rejected the conten-
tion that civil commitment cases are not subject to judicially manageable stan-
dards. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 n.10 (1975). See also
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
25 Spece II, supra note 246, at 1058-59. See also note 251 supra.
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persons. The least restrictive alternative theory only requires the
state to confine these individuals in the least intrusive manner.
Treatment will ordinarily lessen the intrusion of confinement
and thus will ordinarily be required. If the state demonstrates
that providing treatment would not enhance an individual's
freedom or improve his mental condition, then treatment would
not be required. 5 Under this standard of review, therefore, the
courts would pay close attention to both the state's and the pa-
tient's interest.
Adopting the least restrictive alternative standard would
likely result in treatment tailored to the needs of the individual.
This in turn would likely hasten the recovery and release of pa-
tients, thus lessening the infringement on their liberty interests.
The least restrictive alternative test would also provide an in-
centive for legislators to pass laws that do not rest on overbroad
classifications. Narrower legislation would more sharply focus on
individuals who truly need commitment and treatment. More se-
lective commitment would result.
The greatest disadvantage of the least restrictive alternative
theory is that it may generate greater administrative problems
and costs. Because judicial inquiry would entail questioning
medical judgment, legislative intent, and patients' needs on a
case-by-case basis, judicial supervision could become time-con-
suming and costly. Nonetheless, gains would result. Given treat-
ment tailored to need, discharge of some patients would be pos-
sible. Further, the increased administrative costs might spur
legislators to. devise well-tailored programs to avoid over-com-
mitment of patients and excessive judicial review.
3. The Least Restrictive Alternative Theory in the Lower
Courts
Numerous jurisdictions recognize the least restrictive alterna-
tive doctrine in statutes applicable to treatment of the involun-
tarily committed.2 " Moreover, many courts have recognized a
115 See text accompanying note 247 supra.
" See Philipp v. Carey, 517 F. Supp. 513, 517 (N.D.N.Y. 1981). See-also
Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117, 131 n.15 (3d Cir. 1981); Romeo v. Youngberg, 644
F.2d 147, 167 n.46 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2313 (1981) (No. 80-
1429, 1981 Term); United States v. Ecker, 543 F.2d 178, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977); Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 120 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Welsch v.
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constitutional right to receive treatment in settings that are
least restrictive of personal liberty. These courts have differed,
however, in their interpretations of the requirements.2 "7 One
court has held that the Constitution only guarantees involunta-
rily confined persons treatment that is minimally adequate to
furnish a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve their
mental condition.2 58 Another court has declared that a constitu-
tional right to treatment requires a program of treatment that
affords an individual a reasonable chance to acquire and main-
tain those life skills that will enable him to cope as effectively as
his own capacities permit.2 59 Still another court has stated that
the essential elements of minimally adequate treatment include
humane physical and psychological treatment environments,
sufficient numbers of qualified staff, and an individualized treat-
ment plan for each patient.2 60 Finally, one court has held that
the state must give thoughtful consideration to the individual's
needs, treat him constructively according to his own situation,
and carefully tailor the means used to effectuate the state's sub-
stantial concerns to minimize infringement of protected
interests."'
4. The Vulnerability of the Least Restrictive Alternative
Right to Treatment Theory
Chief Justice Burger gave at least seven criticisms of a consti-
tutional right to treatment.262 Some of these criticisms are irrele-
vant to the least restrictive alternative theory.263 Assessment of
the relevant criticisms indicates that the theory remains intact
as a foundation for a right to treatment for the institutionalized
patient.
Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 502 (D. Minn. 1974). See also notes 5-6 supra.
257 Philipp v. Carey, 517 F. Supp. 513, 517-18 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
258 Flakes v. Percy, 511 F. Supp. 1325, 1338 (W.D. Wis. 1981).
259 Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 302 (D. Md. 1979).
260 Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908, 915 (W.D. Mo. 1979). See also
Woe v. Mathews, 408 F. Supp. 419, 427-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
261 Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1217 (E.D. La. 1976).
262See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
262 E.g., notes 31-76 and accompanying text supra (the "historical" argu-
ment). The least restrictive alternative argument derives from doctrines of
equal protection and due process. These are, of course, of long standing. Their




Chief Justice Burger's criticism that mental illness is not com-
pletely curable has no place in least restrictive alternative analy-
sis. 64 Whether a patient is curable, his right to liberty remains
intact.265 "[Aippropriate deference to medical expertise does not
diminish the judicial duty to safeguard liberty interests impli-
cated in treatment decisions."266 The least restrictive alternative
standard applies even when treatment is only partially effective.
Least restrictive alternative analysis also avoids the Chief Jus-
tice's criticism that the psychiatric field lacks unanimity.
2 7
Under this doctrine, unanimity in psychiatry is of relatively lit-
tle importance in deciding whether to provide treatment to par-
ticular patients. There is unanimity that liberty is a protected
interest " and that mental patients are entitled to assert this
interest.26 In the rare case in which expert psychiatrists disagree
completely about the particular form of treatment, an institu-
tion should not be relieved of the burden of supplying treat-
ment.17 1 Instead, the institution should make an independent
evaluation.
Chief Justice Burger also argues that treatment would be inef-
fective because some patients might not cooperate.2 1 A patient's
competent refusal of treatment should, of course, be respected
and serve as a waiver of the right to treatment. A waiver of the
right by some patients, however, should not preclude exercise of
that right by all patients.
Chief Justice Burger further asserts that "[t]he quid pro quo
theory is a sharp departure from . . . due process . . . [because
it] presupposes that essentially the same interests are involved
in every situation where a State seeks to confine an individ-
ual. .... ,"272 The least restrictive alternative right to treatment
2" O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
16 See notes 176-187 and acconipanying text supra.
16 Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 165 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101
S. Ct. 2313 (1981).
2' See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
2" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; L. TRIBE, supra note 117, at 564-985.
2" Notes 179-180 and accompanying text supra.
17 See notes 77-85 and accompanying text supra.
s' O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J. con-
curring).
27I Id. at 586.
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theory does not assume that identical interests are at stake in
every situation. It requires a case-by-case determination. Under
the least restrictive alternative theory, a court inquires into both
the state's and the patient's interests, and then examines availa-
ble alternatives. This allows the state to achieve its goals of con-
finement, as well as to provide treatment for the individual.
The Chief Justice argues that, "rather than inquiring whether
strict standards of proof or periodic redetermination of a pa-
tient's condition are required in civil confinement, the [right to
treatment] theory accepts the absence of such safeguards but in-
sists that the State provide benefits which, in the view of a
court, are adequate 'compensation' for confinement."''17  The
least restrictive alternative theory is not, however, based on a
quid pro quo rationale. The lack of procedural safeguards does
not trigger least restrictive alternative analysis. Rather, it is trig-
gered by the infringement of an individual's right to freedom
from confinement. Under an invigorated standard of review, the
court's focus is just as much on the patient's interest as on the
state's. Least restrictive alternative analysis should thus
strengthen rather than weaken patients' rights to liberty.
The Chief Justice finally contends that the type of judicial in-
tervention contemplated in right to treatment cases may be be-
yond the traditional limitations on the scope of judicial re-
view.174 The type of judicial intervention required to determine
or order appropriate treatment is no more extraordinary or ex-
pansive than is ordinary litigation. 7 5 Judicial supervision of de-
fault judgments, pre-judgment remedies, probate and trust ad-
ministration, and bankruptcy 27 6 is just as elaborate as the
judicial intervention required in right to treatment cases. In
view of the courts' substantial intervention in ordinary litiga-
tion, a court would not be acting outside its customary role in
right to treatment cases.
D. Theoretical Maximum Duration of Commitment
Finally, we propose an additional theory supporting treatment
for persons who are civilly confined in mental institutions. This
theory is based, not on substantive due process or equal protec-
"I Id. at 587.
274 Id.
'76 Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 23, at 474-94.
27 Id. at 482-86.
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tion, but on procedural due process. The theory does not call for
a right to treatment; instead it demands adherence to procedu-
ral due process throughout a mental patient's commitment. Con-
finement beyond the time necessary to enable the patient to re-
turn to society may be a deprivation of liberty without .due
process of law. On the other hand, by providing treatment, the
state would effectively be able to insulate itself from habeas
corpus and other challenges to its power to detain an individual.
1. The Theory
One basic tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence is that no
person should be deprived of liberty without a fair hearing." In
civil commitment proceedings, courts relax procedural safe-
guards, but still require a minimum level of procedural due pro-
cess to legitimize the deprivation of the patient's liberty.1
7 Just
as detention of a criminal inmate beyond the date of his sen-
tence constitutes a denial of liberty without due process,' the
confinement of a mental patient beyond the time authorized for
detention effects an identical deprivation.
In criminal cases, a statute or court order usually specifies the
duration of confinement. 80 It is more difficult, however, to artic-
ulate the duration of commitment authorized by commitment
orders. Mental patient inmates are not sentenced; rather, they
are committed until able to return to society. 81 Nonetheless, the
absence of a defined expiration date for civil confinement should
not preclude protection of a mental patient's liberty through
procedural due process.
2. Theoretical Maximum Duration of Commitment
Obviously, it is impossible to predict accurately the time nec-
essary to enable a mental patient to return to society. Nor is it
possible to estimate accurately the date when a currently incar-
27 L. TRInE, supra note 117, § 10-7 (Procedural Due Process: Intrinsic and
Instrumental Aspects).
"8 See notes 112-118 and accompanying text supra.
'79 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (federal habeas corpus
remedy for improper detention).
"0 See generally B. ENNIS & R. Emmigy, supra note 129, at 130-31 (3d ed.
1978).
20' See generally F. Mixits, R. DAwsON, G. Dix & R. PARHAs, THE MENTAL
HEALTH PRocEss ch. 17 (1971).
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cerated person might safely be released. Still, there exists a the-
oretical maximum duration of commitment that marks the outer
limits of the state's license to confine a mental patient.2 2 To
ascertain this limit, courts should presume that the durational
limitations have expired unless treatment has been provided for
a substantial part of the confinement period.
3. Application of the Theory
Assume that P, through his guardian, files a writ of habeas
corpus seeking release from state hospital D. The state obtained
authority to confine P at a proper hearing, where the court com-
mitted P on the ground, for example, of his danger to others.
The state's authority to confine P, however, is not perpetual;
rather, it is limited to the time it would take to enable D to
return P to society.288 The court must therefore determine
whether this maximum duration of commitment has expired by
looking to the facts of the case and applying the following
presumption: 8
If the patient has been and is being given substantial treatment,
and is still confined in an institution, the theoretical maximum du-
ration of commitment has not yet expired, and continued confine-
ment is legitimate. If the patient has not been given treatment and
is still confined, however, the theoretical maximum duration of
commitment has expired, and continued confinement is an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of liberty without due process.
282 In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), a unanimous Court wrote that
"At the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commit-
ment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual
was committed." Id. at 738. See also D. WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH LAW 33-34
(1981) (periodic review of status of the confined mentally ill is required).
282 It is clear, for example, that patients must be discharged as soon as the
basis for commitment no longer exists. The O'Connor Court recognized this in
writing that it was not "enough that Donaldson's original confinement was
founded upon a constitutionally adequate basis ... because even if his invol-
untary confinement was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally con-
tinue after that basis no longer existed." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
574-75 (1975). See also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.33(d) (McKinney 1978).
284 This presumption, like most presumptions, is aimed at forwarding certain
policy goals at the expense of others. See generally Cleary, Presuming and
Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1959). It pro-
tects the interests of confined mental patients in receiving treatment or dis-
charge. The interest submerged is that of the state in continued and undis-
turbed confinement of patients without providing treatment.
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By presuming that the theoretical maximum duration of com-
mitment has expired, the court protects, at state expense, the
patient's liberty interests. If the state's authority to confine has
expired, the state has no power to detain P, and P may win his
release. Although the state may recommit P, the state will also
have an incentive to provide treatment to avoid repeated* suc-
cessful challenges to commitment. As a result, strict compliance
with procedural due process may yield treatment for those con-
fined in state mental institutions.
CONCLUSION
For more than twenty years, the theory that treatment is the
quid pro quo that justifies the state's ability to confine the men-
tally ill has been the subject of judicial and scholarly debate. In
O'Connor v. Donaldson,8 5 the Supreme Court's most recent
analysis of the right to treatment, Chief Justice Burger articu-
lated seven criticisms of the theory. While some of these objec-
tions may have appeared valid in 1975, when the Chief Justice
made them, they no longer withstand critical scrutiny. As a re-
sult, there are no historical, medical, or doctrinal objections to
prevent the Court from finding that the involuntarily committed
mentally ill have a constitutional right to treatment.
This article has examined and developed three substantive
grounds other than the quid pro quo rationale for finding a right
to treatment. These theories derive from the right to protection
from harm, the constitutional mandate of equal protection, and
the requirement that states choose the least restrictive alterna-
tive available when intruding on fundamental interests. In addi-
tion, the article has posited a "theoretical maximum duration of
commitment," a procedural due process theory that requires
treatment until a patient may be safely released.
When the Supreme Court next addresses the issue,t as it soon
286 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
t As this article went to press, the Supreme Court decided Youngberg v.
Romeo, 50 U.S.L.W. 4681 (U.S. June 18, 1982). The Court held that confined
mentally retarded persons have a right to safe conditions, to freedom from un-
necessary bodily restraint, and to such training, or "habilitation," as is neces-
sary to effectuate those rights. Id. at 4683. The Court did not reach the ques-
tion of whether a broad, independent, right to treatment exists. Id. at 4684. In
a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger reiterated his earlier position that
there is no such constitutional right. Id. at 4686 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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must, it will find that Chief Justice Burger's objections to a right
to treatment have vanished. Should the Court find it wise or
compelling to adopt the right, it may ground its choice on at
least four sound theoretical foundations.
